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Workshops

Natural language and the language of thought

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

I found Thom’s book extremely illuminating, insightful and enjoyable. I learned a great deal from it, and look forward to this online discussion, from which I’m sure I’ll learn a lot more.


One point where I was left feeling rather frustrated was in the brief discussion of Chomsky’s views on language and adaptation (section 6.2). I had been hoping to get some guidance on how to think about the increasingly acrimonious debates between Chomsky and others on the existence or non-existence of a dedicated language faculty or Universal Grammar, but Thom remains officially neutral on this.As he says in the Précis,

"What might be a natural object of study is an innate cognitive mechanism – sometimes called a Universal Grammar – without which we would not be able to acquire and use languages. I say that this only “might be” a natural object of study simply because whether such a mechanism actually exists is a disputed and much vexed issue, on which I am personally agnostic."

Although I would have liked to hear more on the pros as well as the cons of Universal Grammar, what mainly frustrates me is the possibility that what Chomsky means by language is not the same as what Thom means, so the discussion may be at least partly at cross-purposes.

Inferential communication and information theory

Speaking Our Minds is a timely book that very effectively frames many of the current important problems facing researchers interested in the nature of language and communication. Too few scholars today are worried simultaneously about evolutionary psychology and pragmatics, and ever since my introduction to Thom’s work with his article “Defining biological communication” I have found myself often in high agreement with his conclusions. That said, the main point of contention I would like to bring to the group here is actually a fairly fundamental issue in which my own view has recently shifted away from modern pragmatics theory. The issue concerns the purported distinction between the code model of communication and ostensive-inferential communication, and what it really adds to our current understanding. Is the supposed failure of an information theory-based code model an outdated (and false) argument from a previous time in pragmatics that needed a straw man? I’m thinking it is. 

One concern at the heart of the code model problem involves the role of inference in communication. Unconscious inference is a central concept in cognitive science: it’s everywhere. Even the most low-level adaptive problems in perception involving feature detection and integration are solved through inferential procedures. Bottom-up information across modalities is often structured statistically but highly impoverished, so computational solutions incorporate rich priors to extract meaningful data that can be further processed, eventually leading to perceptual experience. Top-down processes are central to all of cognition, and importantly, communication. I’m sure Thom would agree. There does not seem to be much objection to the application of information theory to these topics, so it’s not just a problem about inference on unobservable data. But then what is it exactly? If we are to approach human communication generally, and linguistic communication specifically, from a computational point of view, it is hard to imagine how one might model these inferential processes free from information theory. 

One explanation to rule them all?

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

The field of language evolution, it seems to me, is a microcosm of the evolutionary behavioral sciences more generally, in the following sense: you can maintain more or less any position you want, even in the face of data. Is there a Universal Grammar? Some are convinced there is and others are equally positive there isn’t, with subjective probabilities for the two hypotheses hovering in the high nineties and low single digits, respectively, in the opposing camps. Is spoken language evolutionarily old, or relatively recent? Take your pick. Are there language-specific cognitive adaptations, or not? It depends on your postal code.

Amidst this free-for-all, many have tried their hand at finding the holy grail of language evolution: the single unique feature from which all the rest of language’s notorious complexity follows, the one explanatory ring to rule them all. Examples include Michael Tomasello’s candidate, shared intentionality, and Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch’s recursion. With Speaking Our Minds (SOM), Thom Scott-Phillips introduces and defends his own candidate for what makes human language special: ostensive-inferential communication, which is in turn made possible by recursive mindreading. SOM mounts an impressive theoretical argument, and along the way makes a strong plea for the importance of bringing pragmatics to the fore in thinking about language evolution. I think the praise that the book has received is well-deserved, and I can’t imagine any serious scholar in the field of language evolution won’t feel compelled to read it and to engage with its arguments.

Intending to speak our mind, and speaking our mind

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

Thom Scott-Phillips' contribution consists in further grounding Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson’s Relevance Theory into an evolutionary and cognitive framework for the advent of human language. I take it that the central thesis of Scott-Phillips’ book is that language is not an organ. Rather, it is the result of the joint capacity for ostensive-inferential communication—a side product of increased social capabilities for recursive mindreading—in addition to the production and cultural transmission/transformation of conventional codes. Scott-Phillips’ project is a difficult one and, to me, the synthetic review he offers in his recent book is an important step forward.

I want to focus on a mechanism that, in my view, is important for Scott-Phillips’ project, but not directly discussed in the book: the capacity to produce public displays from private, mental representations. I will see how it relates to some of the conceptual points made in the book — the issue about continuity and discontinuity between natural and conventional codes, and the role of natural codes in the evolution of ostensive-communication.

Communication, culture, and biology in the evolution of language

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

Speaking Our Minds is an enjoyable book, providing an excellent survey of some of the perennial and current issues in the field of language evolution, as well as providing a clear summary of Thom’s position on the central role of ostensive-inferential communication in language origins. I hope neither author will mind if I say that it reminded me very strongly of Jim Hurford’s recent (and rather more monumental) books on the same topic, which is perhaps not so surprising since Thom studied with Jim. It’s also worth pointing out that it’s a very bold book, since some of the crucial evidence that Thom would need to nail down his position isn’t available – I can’t help but be struck by how many cells in table 4.2 (which in reviewing the evidence for the human-uniqueness of capacities for ostensive-inferential communication is really the heart of the book’s argument) are filled “Not (yet) directly studied”. I hope the book stimulates some of that work.

I want to make two comments here, on sections of the book where Thom touches most closely on work that I am most familiar with, on the cultural evolution of language (Chapter 5) and (much more briefly!) how that changes our understanding of what the biological capacity for language actually is (Chapter 6). 

Enjoyable, but doesn't solve the mystery

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

I have read Thom Scott-Philips’ book with great pleasure, but also with a very critical eye. It is extremely well written— I have read most of it during long train rides and had no difficulties concentrating on it. For someone who is as easily distracted as myself that says quite something. I also felt myself almost persuaded by the arguments, but in the end there are many things with which I disagree.

I do agree that pragmatics and inference are extremely important in language, and that they perhaps deserve more attention than they usually get. However, I also do think that Thom presents too much of a straw man argument. Most serious students of language evolution have been convinced of the importance of pragmatics and inference for a long time (although, given the complexity of the subject they may not have made it the focus of their research). The position that Thom appears to be arguing against is perhaps the syntax-centred, Chomsky-inspired formal view of language. However this position is of decreasing importance in both linguistics and the study of language evolution.

I definitely do not agree that the ostensive-inferential model proposed by Thom solves all problems of language evolution.

Alignments across disciplines

By Ira Noveck & Tiffany Morisseau

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

This book left a very positive impression on us both. It is practically a manifesto for clear thinking about doing proper Gricean analyses in applied areas of communication. Speaking our minds (SOM), which describes and reshapes the theoretical landscape in the evolutionary biology of communication, allowed us to compare and contrast that field of inquiry with the field of experimental pragmatics, the area we know best. Here is how the two are similar: Both fields make room for the Code model and a Gricean Ostensive-Inferential model, both recognize Grice’s monumental proposal as important, and yet in each of our respective fields, it seems like a majority takes it for granted that the Code model should be the point of reference.

Another generally appreciated feature of the work is the way Thom clears away misconstruals and addresses incorrect assumptions, for example when he points out that shared function does not mean shared histories:

Combinatoriality and codes

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

I read this book as part of an interdisciplinary reading group at Cardiff. As we found, there’s a lot to agree with in the book, but the commentary below focuses on two points that we found confusing.

Combinatorial communication

Chapter 2 claims to be about the impressive expressive power of language: we can construct an infinite number of sentences, expressing new ideas and capturing a huge range of meanings with a finite set of building blocks. At least, this is what Pinker and Fodor and others find extraordinary about language. The apparent target explanation of this chapter is whether code communication or ostensive communication is the most likely route to it. But instead of trying to explain the productivity and expressivity of language by focusing on compositionality and systematicity, the chapter focuses on ‘combinatorial’ communication of a particular kind. However, this neither fits with usual definitions of either combinatoriality (combining meaningless units) or compositionality (combining meaningful units where the meaning of the whole is composed of sub-meanings of parts), and I think ends up answering a very different sort of question.

No communication without reputation, no reputation without communication

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

I chose to organise an ICCI book club around Speaking Our Minds because it is an exceptional book in more than one way. It ties together two research traditions¬—the pragmatic approach to linguistics and the Darwinian legacy in biology—, that lie at the heart of our field. It does so in a perfect format—the book is a delight to read, and to teach. Yet a good Book Club book should be more than a good book: it should also stir up discussions.

Speaking Our Minds (SOM) is sure to do that: here is a book that claims to solve every major problem linked with the birth of human language! I won’t be the only one who doubts that. I think that Thom Scott-Phillips’ account of how human communication evolved leaves at least one key problem unsolved: How is communication stable in the face of free-riding and deception? In the two sections of SOM that he devotes to that issue (6.5.–6.6), and in his paper On the correct application of animal signalling theory to human communication, Thom rejects the standard solutions to the problem. In the field of language evolution, these tend to come from signalling theory, and to involve the Handicap Principle . With some nuances, I share his grim view of the prospects of signalling theory. Yet his own solution is not just extremely sketchy, at times it verges on circularity.

Cultural attraction, “standard” cultural evolution, and language

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

Speaking Our Minds
 (SOM) was a great pleasure to read. This slim book provides even a non expert like myself with an accessible but, at the same time, in-depth treatment of language evolution. Scott-Phillips proposes us a coherent and, according to him, exhaustive, picture of the origins and evolution of language. The big questions are answered: we can proceed to the next topic.

I wonder how the community of linguists will feel in regard to this bold attitude (by the way, I am all for bold attitudes). As for myself, I can comment on a particular aspect of the book, that is, the role assigned to cultural attraction in explaining some of the features of language.

Key notions in the study of communication

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

I am enthusiastic about Thom Scott-Phillips’ book. It integrates cutting-edge research in several fields, from biology to pragmatics, relevant to the study of the evolution of human communication and it redirects the whole enterprise in a new, much more promising direction. This, however, is not the place to wax lyrical about the book; so, let me focus on a single conceptual question of broad relevance where Thom makes  a very valuable contribution, but one that, I believe, still needs more work on the part of all of us.

In chapter 2, table 2-1, Thom proposes a set of “definitions of key terms in communication” developing the idea that “if an action [of one organism] causes a reaction [of another organism], and both are designed for the purposes of playing that role in the interaction [between the two organisms], then we can term the action a signal and the reaction a response, and the overall interaction communicative. If however, one half or the other was not designed for these purposes, then the action is either a cue or a coercitive behaviour.”

ActionReaction

The idea of defining key notions in the study of communication and related phenomena in term of the presence or absence of interfacing designs or functions is a brilliant one (suggested by John Maynard Smith and David Harper and developed in an original way by Thom), but one that raises a number of difficult issues. I’ll focus on just one such issue.

A few comments on 'Speaking Our Minds'

By Paulo Sousa and Karolina Prochownik

We would like first to thank the ICCI team for the invitation to participate in the book club around Thom Scott-Phillips’ Speaking Our Minds, where a new theory of the evolution of human language and communication is put forward. This is a fantastic book full of groundbreaking ideas, and we are pretty much persuaded by the proposal. We are not experts on the topic and in our commentary we shall focus on some aspects of the book that we thought could have been approached from a slightly different angle or could have been a bit more elaborated, without presuming that our concerns challenge the core tenets of the book in any respect.

Communication

Scott-Phillips characterizes communication as a type of interaction that involves actions and reactions that have functional interdependence, where the source of the function may be natural selection or human intentionality (SOM, 29–33). We couldn’t avoid the feeling that this characterization is not specific enough. Take a physical fight between members of two species with attack-defense dispositions that evolved complementarily (e.g., in the context of a predator-prey relationship). All behavioral aspects of the fight seem to be communicative according to the above characterization, but it seems to us that only some aspects related to the transmission of information are communicative, and the above characterization does not seem to have the conceptual resources to specify the relevant aspects.

Why do children but not apes acquire language?

(This post forms part of our "book club" discussing Thom Scott-Phillip's latest book with its author. This précis introduced the discussion.)

In his introduction to Thom Scott-Phillips’s Speaking Our Minds, Olivier Morin mentioned my review of the book in the TLS. For reasons of length I could not include more substantive objections to chapters 3 and 4 of Thom’s book in that review. However, since the gaps in his argument undermine his claim to have explained why humans but not apes acquired language, I don’t think the issues are trivial. While I develop some of these points elsewhere (see the footnote for details), since some of those papers are not yet out, this discussion seems like as good a place as any to point out the reservations that I have with some of the central claims of the book.

Central to Scott-Phillips’s explanation of why humans alone evolved language are, he claims, two cognitive abilities: the ability to act with and understand fourth order meta-representations, and the ability to distinguish between ‘informative’ and ‘communicative’ intentions. Scott-Phillips argues that humans but not apes acquired language because they possess both of these abilities in ways that apes do not. I don’t think this claim is defended adequately in his book.

'Speaking Our Minds' Book Club: A précis of the book by Thom Scott-Phillips


9781137334565
We are thrilled to open our second book club, devoted to Thom Scott-Phillips’ book, 
Speaking Our Minds: Why human communication is different, and how language evolved to make it special. The book has received positive reviews in various media, including the Times Literary Supplement (read Richard Moore's review here), and has been called "an amazing job" (Stuart West), “the most important and best book ever written on the evolution of language” (Dan Sperber).

The book club opens today and will close in two weeks. Thom Scott-Phillips will discuss his book with Alberto Acerbi, Clark Barrett, Greg Bryant, Mathieu Charbonneau, Liz Irvine, Katja Liebal, Richard Moore, Olivier Morin, Ira Noveck Tiffany Morisseau, Kenny Smith, Paulo Sousa & Karolina Prochownik, Dan Sperber, Denis Tatone, Tim Wharton, Deirdre Wilson, Tad Zawidski. Comments are open to anyone who wishes to participate.

The book club opens today with a précis of Speaking Our Minds, written by the author.
 
(Olivier Morin)





A Précis of "Speaking our Minds: Why Human Communication is Different and How Language Evolved to Make it Special" by Thom Scott-Phillips
 
Communication and language have always been key topics for research at the interface of cognition and culture. Rightly so, given the central role that linguistic communication plays in human social and cultural life. In fact, communication and language are doubly important, since they occupy both sides of the cognition and culture coin. On the one side is a cognitive ability, to engage in linguistic communication in the first place. On the other side are cultural objects, namely languages themselves, which are collections of communicative conventions shared within a population. This double importance is reflected in the ambiguity of the phrase “language evolution”, which is used both to describe the study of how humans evolved to communicate in the ways that they do, and the study of how languages themselves evolve, culturally, to take the various forms that they do.

In 1866 the Société de Linguistique de Paris declared that it would no longer consider correspondence on the topic of language origins (“La Société n’admet aucune communication concernant, soit l’origine du langage – soit la création d’une langue universelle”). This “ban” is often said to have curtailed language evolution research, only for it to be reawakened in the 1990s, but this clichéd history has little truth to it. A great deal of language evolution research occurred between 1866 and 1990. Darwin himself speculated on the origins of language just a few years after the Parisian edict, and several 20th-century research agendas directly address language origins. The clearest and most well-known example is the many attempts to teach human language to non-human apes. Contrary to common assertion, 1990 was not year zero for language evolution research.

It is however fair to say that it was during the 1990s that something like an academic field of language evolution began to emerge.

Cultural Evolution at the Santa Fe Institute

Last May, Daniel Dennett gathered, at the Santa Fe Institute, a handful of people who have written about cultural evolution. The general impression was that (as he tweeted some time later) "the meeting revealed a lot of unexpected comon ground". The International Cognition and Culture Institute is happy to publish, by way of proceedings, each participant's summary. Comments are open!

Daniel Dennett's introduction (with comments).

Participants' summaries (in alphabetical order): Susan BlackmoreRobert BoydNicolas ClaidièrePeter Godfrey-SmithJoseph HenrichOlivier MorinPeter RichersonDan SperberKim Sterelny.

(We gratefully acknowledge the generous support of Louis Godbout, which made the meeting possible.)

Olivier Morin

These are Olivier Morin's remarks on the workshop on cultural evolution convened by Dan Dennett in Santa Fe in May 2014. Dennett's introduction is here. Click to see other summaries by BlackmoreBoydClaidièreGodfrey-SmithHenrichRichersonSperberSterelny. 

***

Here is my 200% subjective summary of the main points of agreement (and some disagreements) touched upon in our (to me quite unforgettable) workshop.

On memes and replicators

There seems to be a consensus (although I am sometimes not sure whether to include Blackmore in it) on several points:

— « Let's be Darwinian about Darwinism » (Dennett). Darwinian evolution should not be essentialized, there are vast grey areas between boundary cases and ideal Darwinian populations. In that spirit, we can make room for creative anticipation and transformation in our views of cultural evolution. Memes, like other scientific notions, can survive a radical re-thinking of the theory they first served to advertize: « I want to let the word "meme" go the way the words "atom" and "gene" went: de-Darwinize it! » (Dennett)

— Both transformation and selection drive cultural evolution. We dont know what their respective weights are (and the answer probably varies quite a lot from situation to situation) but there are reasons to think that these weights contribute to cultural evolution in an additive way: the less of one, the more of the other. Also, the proportion of transformation vs. replication determines what area we are in in Godfrey-Smith's space.

Kim Sterelny

These are Kim Sterelny's thoughts (written up at mid-workshop) on the workshop on cultural evolution convened by Dan Dennett in Santa Fe in May 2014. Dennett's introduction is here. Click to see other summaries by BlackmoreBoydClaidièreGodfrey-SmithHenrichMorinRichersonSperber.

***

Santa Fe Summary: Key Issues From Discussion

1.Attraction and selection. What is the relationship between the SMC attractor based framework, and the BRH approach, which prima facie finds a more obvious role for selection and adaptation, especially cumulative adaptation. While the SMC group do not deny the existence of examples of adaptive complexity, their discussion and models are not organised around these kinds of cases. In the discussion, I tried out one way of seeing how the two approaches might fit together, borrowing from the saner versions of evo-devo: see the mechanisms identified in the SMC approach as constraints and biases in the supply of variation to selection-like processes. Except in extreme cases where those constraints reduce the supply of variation to a trickle (as in C’s zebra finch case, we the experimental set up exposes the hatchling to a single model) that can still leave plenty of work for selection-like forces. I take it the SMC suggestion was to see the attractor-approach as more general than selectionist approaches, which for them come out as a special form of attraction. That seems to me to obscure an important distinction between the supply of variation and its fate. But maybe M’s suggestion does not fit that evo-devo picture, seeing he focuses on downstream constraints that affect success rate (on whether a cultural variant is a flop). But what is the difference between that and selection (selection often depends on factors internal to a lineage, as in the relationship between sexual selection and sensory biases).

Rob Boyd

These is the beginning of Robert Boyd's thoughts on the workshop on cultural evolution convened by Dan Dennett in Santa Fe in May 2014. Boyd's full text, because it contains mathematical symbols, is in PDF format and is accessible here. Dennett's introduction is here. Click to see other summaries by BlackmoreClaidière, Godfrey-SmithHenrichMorinRichersonSperberSterelny.

***

Some thoughts about things I learned at Dan Dennett's excellent party

I have been thinking about the relationship between the kind of models that Pete, Joe and I have made and the ECM framework sketched by Dan and Nicolas in their paper. In particular, I have trying to understand how the mechanistic processes represented in our approach relate to homo-hetero distinction central to the ECM approach. In my remarks on Sue Blackmore's papers I sketched a simple model in which there were two variants with a selection stage and a transformation stage. So, rst I'd like to convert this model to the ECM framework developed by Sperber and Cladiere.

More here

Joseph Henrich

These are Joseph Henrich's thoughts on the workshop on cultural evolution convened by Dan Dennett in Santa Fe in May 2014. Dennett's introduction is here. Click to see other summaries by BlackmoreBoydClaidièreGodfrey-SmithMorinRichersonSperberSterelny. 

***

Based on our five days of discussion, I tried to come up with a list of stuff we agree on:

1. Cultural evolution is a crucial phenomenon for understanding humans (at least). It’s a worthy goal to develop a broad framework for thinking and studying cultural evolution.

2. Natural selection has shaped human minds in ways that have a big impact on cultural evolution.

3. Some of these reliably developing psychological products of natural selection can usefully be thought of as adaptations for effectively learning from others, which include content-rich mechanisms that facilitate inferential reconstruction during cultural transmission as well as mechanisms that help learners select those members of their social world most likely to possess useful stuff to learn. Workshop members varied on how important or interesting these different elements were, but everyone seemed happy to get down to the business of sorting out when, where and how much. What we need is a large body of empirical work on specific cases.

Susan Blackmore

These are Susan Blackmore's thoughts on the workshop on cultural evolution convened by Dan Dennett in Santa Fe in May 2014. Dennett's introduction is here. Click to see other summaries by BoydClaidièreGodfrey-SmithHenrichMorinRichersonSperberSterelny. 

***

There was much agreement at the wonderful working party in Santa Fe. For example, we agreed about the importance of re-production, reconstruction, teaching and demonstration as well as true imitation. I loved DS’s T-shirt folding video, but concluded that the variety and complexity of these processes does not detract from the fact that the folded T-shirt and the skill of folding it are memes that are passed on and selfishly compete with other variants.

We all agreed that there is always a leash (if have previously implied that the memes could entirely escape, I would now suggest this is only possible in the digital world of temes). We all agree that, as RB put it ‘imitation did not just happen’ but arose because of relevant selection pressures.

I’m sure others will describe the many areas of agreement better than I can. I would prefer to note some points of disagreement or openness and the shifts that took place as we discussed the wide range of differing ideas and research methods.

Subcategories

  • PedagogyWeek

    In November 2010, an informal on-line workshop gathered psychologists and philosophers, to discuss the implications of a new theory of human communication and cultural transmission. Participants were György Gergely, Olivier Morin, Dan Sperber, Marion Vorms and Davie Yoon.

    Article Count:
    6
  • Decision-making for a social world

    The International Cognition and Culture Institute (Institut Jean Nicod and LSE) and the Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program at the University of Pennsylvania organize a virtual seminar Decision Making for a Social World. The aim of this seminar is to bring together threads of research in decision making and related areas of psychology that show how deeply our decisions are influenced by our social context. Some of this research even takes the stronger stance that some of the mechanisms that are typically thought of as being within the purview of individual cognition actually have a social function. It will begin in February 2011. Every two weeks a new paper will be posted and a moderated discussion will take place online among invited discussants and the public one the one hand, and the author on the other hand. Here are some of the themes that will be explored: Group decision making. This is the primary case of direct influence of the social context. Groups can allow people to solve more complex problems but they can also amplify their biases. Through which mechanisms is their influence exerted? Accountability. The social context often exerts an influence on our decisions because we have-or at least we think we will have-to publicly justify our decisions. Trust and advice taking. Many of our decisions have been influenced by the advice given by other people. Are we influenced by advice too much or too little? How do we calibrate the weight put on the advice as a function of who is offering it? Pragmatics. Most decision making tasks use verbal material, yet they frequently ignore that such material will often lead to pragmatic implications that can influence participants' answers. Evolution. Many scholars in the field of human evolution contend that social factors were the primary pressure in our evolution, yet the field of decision making has failed to draw all the implications from this suggestion. These are only examples as many areas in decision making show that the social context exerts a huge impact on our decisions, from the study of norms to that of self-control. We look forward to the opening of the conference and the discussions that will ensue! Hugo Mercier

    Article Count:
    14
  • Dunbar's number
    Article Count:
    3
  • 'Big Gods' book club
    Article Count:
    7
  • SFI Cultural Evolution Workshop
    Article Count:
    11
  • 'Speaking Our Minds' Book Club
    Article Count:
    14