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reasoning and weird beliefs
Hugo Mercier 09-02

True credulity = suspension of disbelief?
Emma Cohen 08-02

Personal experience
José-Luis Guijarro 05-02

That "horrible" voice
Bill Benzon 05-02

Going back to the beginning
José-Luis Guijarro 04-02

Latest Blog Posts

There is no such thing as sexual intercourse

Pascal Boyer | 8/2/2010

Altruistic adoption in chimpanzees?

Nicolas Baumard | 3/2/2010

Experimental epidemiology: The work of Chip Heath

Hugo Mercier | 1/2/2010

Four recipes for religion

Harvey Whitehouse | 25/1/2010

Mad in America

Ophelia Deroy | 20/1/2010

Na'vi Cognition and Culture

Nicolas Baumard | 19/1/2010

Cognition under the high brow

Pascal Boyer | 14/1/2010

Cross potatoes

Brian Malley | 7/1/2010

Essentialist animals?

Helen De Cruz | 5/1/2010

Jingle Bell - Punjabi Tadka

Dan Sperber | 24/12/2009

Golden bell and Iron shirt

Brian Malley | 17/12/2009

Conversation Hackers

Olivier Morin | 12/12/2009

Three Questions for Simon Baron-Cohen

Emma Cohen | 8/12/2009

The scope of natural pedagogy theory (II): uniquely human?

Pierre Jacob | 6/12/2009

Can you tell the language of the mother from her baby's cry?

Nicolas Claidière | 2/12/2009

Death, where is thy sting ?

Pascal Boyer | 30/11/2009

The scope of natural pedagogy theory (I): babies

Pierre Jacob | 26/11/2009

Some like it hot

Ophelia Deroy | 25/11/2009

Language faculty? Semiotic system? Or what?

Dan Sperber | 22/11/2009

Is the spell broken? Reflections on evolutionary debunking and religious beliefs

Helen De Cruz | 17/11/2009

“I read Playboy for the articles”

Hugo Mercier | 15/11/2009

Alloparental care and wandering baby monkeys

Nicolas Claidière | 8/11/2009

Scott Atran: A memory of Lévi-Strauss

Scott Atran | 4/11/2009

A question about polemics

Brian Malley | 1/11/2009

Grieving animals?

Dan Sperber | 1/11/2009

Outbreak!

Hugo Mercier | 27/10/2009

The universality of music: Cross-cultural comparison, the recognition of emotions, and the influence of the the Backstreet Boys on a Cockatoo

Nicolas Baumard | 25/10/2009

Proper names in mind, language and culture

Dan Sperber | 20/10/2009

Simian Oeconomicus II

Nicolas Baumard | 18/10/2009

Elinor Ostrom: Nobel Prize in Anthropology!

Nicolas Baumard | 12/10/2009

g Tum-mo heat meditation

Brian Malley | 8/10/2009

Experimental demonstration of cultural attitudes to punishment?

Nicolas Baumard | 6/10/2009

Nick Enfield reviews Atran and Medin's The Native Mind and the Construction of Nature

Nick Enfield | 5/10/2009

Gloria Origgi reviews Jon Elster's "Le désintéressement"

Gloria Origgi | 1/10/2009

The Chameleon effect in Capuchin Monkeys

Nicolas Claidière | 17/9/2009

The quest for Jesus

Brian Malley | 9/9/2009

The compromise effect or, cross-cultural psychology is messy

Hugo Mercier | 6/9/2009

Pierre Jacob reviews 'Mothers and Others', by Sarah B. Hrdy

Pierre Jacob | 4/9/2009

How much of a difference does culture make ?

Olivier Morin | 30/8/2009

Japanese smileys vs. Ekman faces

Olivier Morin | 27/8/2009

How cultural is cultural epidemiology? 2- Cultural embedding

Christophe Heintz | 25/8/2009

Meaning in sounds?

Simon Barthelme | 23/8/2009

Linguistic Epidemiology – Part 1, Units of analysis

Nick Enfield | 19/8/2009

Scylla and Charybdis

Brian Malley | 6/8/2009

Murder in Saint Andrews

Nicolas Claidière | 3/8/2009

How cultural is cultural epidemiology? The case of enculturation

Christophe Heintz | 29/7/2009

A role for dyslexia in language evolution?

Nicolas Claidière | 17/7/2009

Simian Oeconomicus

Nicolas Baumard | 10/7/2009

The Evolution of God?

Hugo Mercier | 9/7/2009

Why you should rank your friends (but not tell them)

Ophelia Deroy | 9/7/2009

The second lecture of the LSE-ICCI lectures series:
"The origin of concepts"
by Susan Carey
is online.


Essentialist animals?
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
05 January 2010

Over the past few decades, there has been a lot of research published on 'psychological essentialism', which has been observed cross-culturally in young children. Essentialism is the tendency to think about animals, plants and social categories in terms of hidden 'essences'. The earliest experiments that indicated psychological essentialism in children were by Frank Keil (1989, Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) who asked preschoolers what would happen if an animal was surgically altered to look like a member of another species. For example, would a raccoon that is surgically modified to look and smell like a skunk actually be a skunk? Young children believed that the creature would still be a raccoon. Three-year-olds and four-year-olds believe that also an apple seed, planted in a flowerpot would still grow out to be an apple tree, or that a cow raised by foster parent pigs would still exhibit normal bovine behavior (Gelman & Wellman, 1991. Insides and essences: Early understandings of the non-obvious. Cognition, 38, 213–244). What is more, children are even more essentialist than adults. For instance, Indian preschoolers believe a Brahmin child remains Brahmin, even when raised by untouchables; Five-year-olds believe that French babies brought up by English-speaking parents will grow up to speak French. Essentialism has been documented in several non-western cultures, indicating that this psychological tendency may be a stable part of human cognition (Gelman 2004, Psychological essentialism in children. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 404–409).

This raises the question: Is essentialism restricted to humans, or does it also occur in other species? Obviously, the experimental procedures I just discussed all rely on language, so experimental design should be radically adapted to probe psychological essentialism in other animalleibniz3s. Yesterday, I was observing (in an unsystematic way) my cat's behavior (an adult male), and his behavior motivated me to think that essentialism may have its roots in the way animals make concepts.

Let me elaborate. Since he was a young kitten, Leibniz, my cat, has been playing with balls of various sizes and in various materials. Ping pong balls, small rubber balls with bells, soft, fluffy balls, etc. Whenever he is presented with a ball and he is in a playful mood, he will gently tap the ball with his front paw. Occasionally, he sees a ball that is obviously too large to play with. Even then, he will try to tap the ball with his front paw (as he did a moment after the picture was taken) and gives up only after a few tries.

 

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Is the spell broken? Reflections on evolutionary debunking and religious beliefs
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
18 November 2009
At the Notre Dame conference Darwin in the 21st century, Paul Griffiths gave an interesting talk on evolutionary debunking arguments for religion. Evolutionary debunking arguments basically say that religious beliefs are unjustified because they are a byproduct of evolved cognitive predispositions. Daniel Dennett's Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon summarizes this position very aptly: If religion is natural, i.e. if religious beliefs can be explained as a byproduct of everyday cognitive capacities, we need not invoke supernatural entities to explain these beliefs.

Guy Kahane (in his forthcoming paper 'Evolutionary debunking arguments' in Noûs - draft available here) argues that evolutionary debunking arguments come in the following general form:
  1. Causal premise: belief is the result of evolved psychological predispositions
  2. Epistemic premise: There is no connection between the truth value of our evolved beliefs and their fitness functions (natural selection is not a truth-tracking process).
  3. Conclusion: Therefore, religious beliefs are unjustified.
Take as an example the tendency of people to think themselves on average smarter, kinder, more attractive, more sophisticated, etc. than others.
Read more...
 
Cumulative culture in the lab and chimpanzees
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
07 May 2009


At the recent EHBEA conference held April 6-8 at Saint Andrews, I saw presentations by both Andrew Whiten (a primatologist who specializes on nonhuman cultural traditions, especially in chimpanzees) and Christine Caldwell (who examines cumulative cultural evolution in the lab). It was interesting to see the question of cumulative cultural evolution from these two very diverging perspectives.

It is now generally established that nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, macaques and a variety of bird species, display a socially transmitted behaviors, which in humans are termed cultures. However, to date the evidence for cumulative cultural evolution in nonhumans remains sporadic. For example, in the case of nut-cracking chimpanzees in the Taï forest, there is little variation in how nuts are being processed, i.e., cracked by means of a hammer and anvil, and whereas some individuals have learned to use auxilliary stones to stabilize the anvil, this innovation has not spread to the entire population. The question is: why not?

a typical use of anvil to crack a nut from a Taï forest chimpanzee

Andrew Whiten recently co-authored a study in which chimpanzees were confronted with an optimal and cumulatively built technique for extracting honey from an artificial device. Whereas the individuals learned the simple 'dipping' technique with ease, they did not master the more complex 'probing' technique, which built on elements of the dipping technique they already mastered. The chimpanzees thus got 'stuck' at a simple but suboptimal technique, although control tests showed that the more difficult technique was not beyond their cognitive capacities. Why would this be? Whiten tentatively suggested in the paper that chimpanzees may be 'conservative', unwilling to try a new technique if the one they already knew was good enough.

Another line of reasoning, which has garnered much attention, is that of Tomasello.

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Cross-cultural variation in creationism
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
04 May 2009

There is substantial cultural variation in the prevalence of creationism, i.e., the view that the Bible (or other religious writings) provides a historically accurate account of how living things came into being. In some countries, like Iceland or Japan, the view that species arose through a gradual process that is characterized by random variation, selective retention and modification through descent, is almost universally accepted. By contrast, and to the chagrin of scientists and philosophers of science in the USA, only 40 - 50 % of US citizens accept evolutionary theory. In this respect, the USA only does slightly better than Turkey, which ranks lowest on the list of Miller et al.'s study in Science (2006, vol. 313). Where does this variability come from?

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How persistent are intuitive (erroneous) beliefs?
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
23 February 2009

My motivation for posting this blog is simple: I am wondering whether it is possible for humans to ever truly internalize counterintuitive scientific principles like evolutionary theory or Newtonian (let alone Einsteinian) physics.

According to developmental psychologists like Elizabeth Spelke or Susan Carey, and cognitive anthropologists like Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber, humans are endowed with inference mechanisms that enable them to acquire knowledge of the world (these inference mechanisms are known by several terms, such as core knowledge, conceptual modules or intuitive ontologies). Sometimes these inference mechanisms are at odds with scientific principles. A well-studied example is impetus physics, the view that inanimate objects, in order to be propelled, have to be laden with a force (impetus) by an agent or another object in order to be set in motion. This impetus physics yields a lot of imprecise predictions: for example, over 50% of adults believe that a ball, being launched by a sling, will continue in a curvilinear path, or that a ball dropped by a running person will fall straight down instead of describing a parabolic path. Newtonian physics, in contrast, predicts a parabolic path, a prediction only consistently made by people with a college training in physics (see McCloskey's 1983 review in Scientific American to get an idea).

However, an ingenious experimental procedure by Kohhenikov and Hegarty (2001), Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8) shows that even expert physicists are guided by the intuitive impetus physics under some conditions.

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Is Saint Nicholas a god?
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
06 December 2008

Saint nick, horse and Petes

Today is 6 December - for those living in Belgium and the Netherlands, Saint Nicholas will come to distribute gifts and candy to young children. Saint Nick has been the predecessor of Santa Claus in the US (as you can still see in his red costume, although the bishop's mitre is replaced by a red bonnet, the horse by a flock of reindeer, the Petes by elves, and all references to Christianity have been discarded). It is remarkable how resilient Saint Nick in spite of the foreign cultural pressure of Santa Claus; he is not likely to go away, even though shops tried to promote Santa Claus fiercely a few years ago.

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Philosophy and Psychology: Special issue on number and language
Helen De Cruz's blog
Written by Helen De Cruz   
03 September 2008
The question of how language and conceptual thought are related is unresolved in both philosophy and psychology. Many recent tests of the so-called 'Whorfian hypothesis', the idea that the structure of a particular language influences the way its speakers conceptualize the world, have focused on number. As has been noted earlier on this blog, the results of these investigations do not present a unified picture.

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