Two doctoral fellowships in cognition and culture
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- Published on Tuesday, 30 April 2013 16:25
Candidates should have pursued (or be finishing) Master’s level studies in relevant fields in anthropology, psychology, economics or other social sciences. For more information, please write to pboyer [at] artsci.wustl.edu, providing details of your studies so far and of your goals.
Post-doctoral position in: human evolution, economics and politics
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- Published on Tuesday, 30 April 2013 16:23
The goal of this project is to investigate the influence of evolved human psychology on social processes typical of modern, large-scale societies. This work will focus on such topics as the design of institutions and their reliance on evolved preferences for cooperation; perceptions of markets and our social exchange psychology; how our “intuitive sociology” is based on evolved small-group interaction; how an evolved psychology of dominance and power is relevant to understanding modern politics; how political programs recruit intuitive moral understandings; etc. Some possible directions of research are described in a summary of the grant proposal. Knowledge of French is not required.
Candidates should have pursued doctoral research in a relevant field in psychology, anthropology, economics or political science. If you are interested, please send Pascal Boyer a CV and relevant publications (or links) as well as a short letter of motivation describing how you would envisage your contribution to this programme. Email: pboyer [at] artsci.wustl.edu.
Postdoctoral position in Moral Psychology in Paris
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- Published on Friday, 22 March 2013 13:01
The Institute of Cognitive Sciences (Ecole Normale Supérieure) is searching for a postdoc to begin working in September 2013, on a newly awarded grant, “The Evolution of Fairness: An Interdisciplinary Approach” (see summary description below). The successful candidate will be part of a newly created team of evolutionary biologists and experimental psychologists, and will conduct experiments on moral judgments (moral dilemmas, distributive justice, punishment, etc.) in the framework of the theory of fairness and partner choice.
Candidates should have substantive expertise in experimental psychology, and a strong interest in evolutionary psychology and moral philosophy. French is not required (the working language at the Institute is English).
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PhD at St. Andrews: Exploring the evolutionary roots of cultural complexity, creativity and trust.
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- Published on Friday, 08 February 2013 20:12
PhD in Cognitive Science at CEU, Budapest
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- Published on Wednesday, 14 November 2012 21:42
4 Post-doc and 4 PhDs on 'Knowledge and Culture' in the Netherlands
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- Published on Monday, 29 October 2012 10:40
In various domains of cognitive science, a new paradigm holds that humans and non-human animals are born with a small set of hard-wired cognitive abilities that are task-specific, language-independent, and non-species-specific. These core knowledge systems are innate cognitive skills that have the capacity for building mental representations of objects, persons, spatial relationships, numerosity, and social interaction. In addition to core knowledge systems, humans possess species-specific, uniquely human abilities such as language and music. The ‘core knowledge’ paradigm challenges scholars in the humanities to ask the question how nurture and culture build on nature. This project examines the way in which innate, non specifically human, core knowledge systems for object representation, number, and geometry constrain cultural expressions in music, language, and the visual arts. In this research program, four domains of the humanities will be investigated from the point of view of core knowledge: (1) music cognition; (2) language and number; (3) visual arts and geometry; (4) poetry, rhythm, and meter. (Full description of the project here.)
Read more: 4 Post-doc and 4 PhDs on 'Knowledge and Culture' in the Netherlands
PhD studentships in Cognitive Science at CEU, Budapest
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- Published on Saturday, 20 October 2012 13:15
Read more: PhD studentships in Cognitive Science at CEU, Budapest
Jobs in Evolutionary Anthropology or Psychology at Arizona State
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- Published on Wednesday, 26 September 2012 10:33
Desired qualifications include a strong record of field, laboratory, and/or model-based research on the interactions between human culture and biology that is grounded in evolutionary theory. Research should focus on human biocultural evolution in deep or more recent time, biocultural interactions in contemporary societies, and/or research on nonhuman primates (particularly great apes ) relevant to human uniqueness.
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PhD position in Social Psychology/Experimental Pragmatics
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- Published on Thursday, 14 June 2012 16:22
PhD 4-year job position Social Psychology/Experimental Pragmatics at the Univeristé Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
Job description:
One PhD position is available within a joint project on pragmatics and social cognition, coordinated by Olivier Klein and Mikhail Kissine. The project will start on October 1st 2012 and end in September 2016. The successful candidate is expected to develop and conduct experimental studies on the mechanisms of gullibility and epistemic vigilance in verbal communication. Net monthly salary starts around 1600 €. (Continued below the fold.)
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2 postdocs at UBC in evolution, cognition and culture
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- Published on Thursday, 03 May 2012 14:02
Joe Henrich informs us: The Centre for Human Evolution, Cognition and Culture (HECC) at the University of British Columbia will be hiring 5 post-doctoral researchers as part of a large, international, collaboration among psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists, historians, and biologists on the evolution of religion. Below is a call for applications for two of these positions. The first is for a historian to spearhead a systematic and comparative study of religion and prosociality (from the historical record). This person will work with Prof. Ted Slingerland. The second is for comparative ethnographic and experimental studies among living populations across the globe (on religion, ritual and prosociality). This person will work with Prof. Ara Norenzayan and me. We are open to anthropologists, psychologists and economists, among others. If possible, we'd like to have this person in place by September 2012 (or at least by Dec). We know that right now is a bad time to search for post-docs to start this fall. For this reason, we would like to consider applicants that can finish their PhD in the fall (perhaps earlier than anticipated) and come immediately to Vancouver.
Read more: 2 postdocs at UBC in evolution, cognition and culture
Lectureship in Cognition and Culture at Belfast
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- Published on Tuesday, 24 April 2012 10:44
A position of Lecturer is open in the School of History and Anthropology at Queen's University, Belfast, to "teach and supervise at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, to participate in the research activities of the Institute of Cognition and Culture, to undertake research in line with the School’s research strategy, and to contribute to the School’s administration and outreach activities." Deadline: May 21, 2012. Details here.
PhD studentships in Cognitive Science at the CEU, Budapest
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- Published on Sunday, 04 December 2011 21:42
PhD studentships are available for the doctoral program in Cognitive Science at Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary. Application deadline: 25 January 2012.
The Department of Cognitive Science at CEU invites applications for doctoral student positions starting in September 2012. This is a research-based training program in human cognition with social cognition and learning as core themes. Research topics include cooperation, communication, social learning, cultural transmission, embodied cognition, joint action, developmental social cognition, strategic decision-making, problem solving, visual cognition, sensory and statistical learning, visual psychophysics, computational neuroscience, and social cognitive neuroscience. Students will follow courses in cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, cognitive anthropology, computational cognition and linguistics, and will receive practical research training in the laboratories of the members of this new department.
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3-year DPhil studentship in anthropology at Oxford to study ritual
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- Published on Wednesday, 30 November 2011 22:19
Applications are invited for an ESRC-funded 3-year DPhil studentship based in the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography to begin in October 2012. The student will be supervised by Professor Harvey Whitehouse (Oxford) and Dr Quentin Atkinson (University of Auckland).
This studentship examines the broad question: what is the relationship between ritual and social organization in the human past? The aim will be to build on recent research suggesting that the intensity of emotional (especially dysphoric) arousal experienced by ritual participants correlates inversely with frequency of performance (Atkinson and Whitehouse, 2010). Whereas low-frequency/high arousal ("imagistic") rituals are associated with small, localized, and intensely cohesive communities, high-frequency/low-arousal ("doctrinal") rituals are found in large-scale, fast-spreading, and diffusely cohesive communities (Whitehouse,1995, 2000, 2004). Temporal and spatial distributions of data may also be used to evaluate predictions generated under a range of models of cultural transmission and evolution (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Henrich, 2009; Pagel, Atkinson, and Meade, 2007; Turchin, 2009). By matching model predictions to observed data under a variety of simulated conditions this DPhil project will seek to identify likely drivers of the cultural shifts as well as to test the performance of competing models of ritual transmission.
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PhD studentships in Cognitive Science at the Central European University (Budapest)
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- Published on Saturday, 15 October 2011 15:01
PhD studentships are available for the doctoral program in Cognitive Science at Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary. Application deadline: 25 January 2012.
The Department of Cognitive Science at CEU invites applications for doctoral positions starting in September 2012. This is a research-based training program in human cognition with social cognition and learning as core themes. Research topics include cooperation, communication, social learning, cultural transmission, embodied cognition, joint action, developmental social cognition, strategic decision-making, problem solving, visual cognition, sensory and statistical learning, visual psychophysics, computational neuroscience, and social cognitive neuroscience. Students will follow courses in cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, cognitive anthropology, computational cognition and linguistics, and will receive practical research training in the laboratories of the members of this new department.
Read more: PhD studentships in Cognitive Science at the Central European University (Budapest)
Post-doc in Cultural or Social Neuroscience
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- Published on Wednesday, 13 April 2011 12:05
Applications accepted for a two-year Postdoctoral Fellowship in Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural or Social Neuroscience, associated with the Foundation for Psychocultural Research – Hampshire College Program in Culture, Brain and Development (FPR-HC CBD).
Three posts on ritual and group formation at Oxford
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- Published on Monday, 28 February 2011 14:11
Applications are sought for three posts focusing on the history of ritual and group formation, as part of an international project entitled 'Ritual, community and conflict', based in the Centre for Anthropology and Mind at the University of Oxford, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and directed by Professor Harvey Whitehouse.
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PhD in Cognitive Science at the CEU, Budapest
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- Published on Sunday, 23 January 2011 23:19
Starting 2011-12, the Department of Cognitive Science at the CEU, Budapest, will offer a PhD programme in Cognitive Science.
The curriculum: The main goal of the PhD program will be to ensure that the students master the basic notions and theories in cognitive science and can do cutting-edge doctoral research in one area of expertise of program, such as social cognitive sciences and the study of social cognition. The PhD program will provide basic training (taught courses) on at least the following topics: Cognitive psychology, Research methods in cognitive science, Social cognition.
Faculty: Gergely Csibra (cognitive development, cognitive neuroscience, József Fiser [from September 2011] (visual perception and cognition, biological and statistical learning), ...
PhD on Animal Cognition and Communication in Vienna
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- Published on Sunday, 23 January 2011 23:09
In recent years, Vienna has become an important center for behavioral and cognitive research, with a strong research focus on comparative cognitive biology. The Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and the University of Vienna have supported this development, by funding a multi-level, integrative PhD training programme on cognition and communication in humans and non-human animals.
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Postdoc for Canadian Citizen in Toronto
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- Published on Wednesday, 24 November 2010 17:23
Dr Afzal Upal, of Defence Research & Development, Canada-Toronto, informs us: "I am planning to start a 3-year research project on human terrain modeling from April 1, 2011. The basic idea is to study intergroup dynamics by first collecting field data on inter-group perceptions (e.g., Canadian perceptions of Americans and vice versa) and then simulate some aspects of the dynamics of intergroup perceptions in an agent-based society. I feel comfortable with the simulation part but I need help with the social theory building, data collection, and analysis. I think that the most appropriate person would be someone with training in psychology or anthropology, familiar with qualitative techniques, and with some experience of working in the field (as opposed to the lab). I am only allowed to hire a Canadian citizen and only for the duration of the project (although there may be opportunities for further work and a permanent position may open up in the future). The position would require full time presence in suburban Toronto area. Pay is negotiable. Please feel free to forward it to anyone you think may be interested."
Temporary Lecturer in Cognition and Culture
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- Published on Monday, 08 November 2010 10:41
Available from 1 February 2011 to 31 August 2012 at Queen's University Belfast - School of History and Anthropology, a Temporary Lectureship in Cognition and Culture to cover a career break, to teach at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, to assist primarily in the current research activities of the Institute of Cognition and Culture, and to undertake research in line with the School's research strategy.
Anticipated interview date: Tuesday 21 December 2010. Closing date: Monday 6 December 2010.
Postdoctoral Research Position in Behavioral Economics
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- Published on Thursday, 08 April 2010 20:43
Central European University announces an opening for a postdoctoral fellow for two years, starting from September 2010 or later, to work on a project in behavioral economics regarding how people take into account their reputation --what others might think of them-- when making decisions. Specific research questions about the role of reputation in decision-making and the cognitive bases of reputation management include: do people use routines or heuristics whose function is to manage their reputation? Is there cross-cultural variations in the ways people manage their reputation and, if there is, why? What, of altruistic behavior, can be accounted for in terms of reputation management? To what extent, and in which sense, are people rational when they manage their reputation?
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PhD Studentship to study Facebook social norms
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- Published on Tuesday, 02 June 2009 08:41
Lectureship at Goldsmiths College, London
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- Published on Monday, 18 May 2009 22:27
The Department of Psychology at Goldsmiths College, London, a thriving centre of research and teaching with around 450 undergraduates, 100 postgraduates and 30 staff, is seeking an excellent researcher and teacher whose work will complement ongoing research within one of its 6 research clusters: cognition and culture, neurodevelopmental disorders, individual differences and psychopathology, social relationships, cognition, cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology plus work psychology. You will have a PhD and a track record of relevant research, published in international peer-reviewed journals, plus evidence of, or clear plans for developing, an externally-funded research programme. You will demonstrate the enthusiasm and skills to teach students, and supervise their research, at all levels of our undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. For further information: www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/jobs . Closing date: Monday 8 June 2009.
PhD Position in the research group Evolutionary Processes in Language and Culture
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- Published on Wednesday, 15 April 2009 05:54
in Language and Culture at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. The research group "Evolutionary Processes in Language
and Culture" is a small, independent group funded by the Max Planck Society to
investigate structural variation in language and culture from an evolutionary
perspective. We seek a talented and motivated student to carry out a mutually agreed
research project in an area complementary to the interests of the group.
The PhD project will involve investigation of the determinants of variation in one
or more large language families, e.g. Austronesian, Bantu and/or Indo-European
(other families/regions can be considered on the basis of data access). The precise
nature of the project will be agreed in collaboration with the successful candidate,
but we envisage that it will be interdisciplinary in orientation, encompassing some
of the following areas.
- Linguistic typology
- Social anthropology
- Evolutionary anthropology
- Historical linguistics
- Phylogenetics
The successful candidate will have access to the research group databases, and will
have the opportunity to participate in group projects. Technical skills in computing
(esp. sql, python, R) and statistics would be advantageous.
The Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics is a vibrant research environment in
a charming university town. Nijmegen is situated 1.5 hours from Amsterdam, and has
easy access to Belgium and Germany.
The PhD position is funded for 3 years (2 year initial contract with a 1 year
extension). The research group provides fully equipped research facilities,
technical support and research assistance, as well as a generous conference and
travel budget, and support for possible fieldwork.
Closing date for application: May 15th, 2009.
The Max Planck Society is an equal opportunity employer. The business of the
institute is conducted in English.
Applicants should send their CV, a short statement of research interests, a sample
of their writing, and the names and e-mail addresses of at least two potential
referees to:
Dr Michael Dunn
Research Group Evolutionary Processes in Language and Culture
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
Postbus 310, 6500AH Nijmegen
The Netherlands
and an electronic version (pdf preferred) to Michael Dunn . Further enquiries may be
sent by email.
Post-doc in Early Social Cognition at the CEU
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- Published on Sunday, 29 March 2009 22:30
Cognitive Developmental Center
Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary
Directed by Professors Gergely Csibra and György Gergely
We have funding for two postdoctoral positions, starting from September 2009 (or when filled), to work collaboratively on research on social cognition in infants and toddlers. Specific questions of investigation include early understanding of ostensive referential communication, the development and representation of artifacts and natural kind concepts, mechanisms of cultural transmission of generic knowledge, and action understanding and representing other minds in normally developing and autistic children, using behavioral, eye-tracking and electrophysiological (EEG and ERP) techniques. Candidates must have a Ph.D. in psychology or a related field, and a strong record of prior research accomplishments. Familiarity with eye-tracking or electrophysiological methodology is an advantage.
Interested persons should send a cover letter stating research interest, a CV, and contact address for 3 references to Human Resources Office, Central European University, H-1051 Budapest, Nádor u. 9., Hungary, e-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . We encourage electronic applications. We will start reviewing applications in mid-April, 2009. Informal inquiries about the positions could be addressed to Professor György Gergely ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ) or to Professor Gergely Csibra ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ).
CEU (www.ceu.hu) is a graduate research-intensive university specializing primarily in the social sciences, located in Budapest, Hungary and accredited in the United States and Hungary. CEU's primary mission is to promote academic excellence, state of the art research and civic commitment, so as to contribute to the development of open societies in Central and Eastern Europe. CEU offers both master's and doctoral programs, and it enrolls about 1500 students from nearly 100 countries. The teaching staff consists of more then 130 resident faculty from more than 30 countries, and a large number of prominent visiting scholars from around the world. The language of instruction is English.
Post-Doc fellowship, philosophy of cognitive science, Oxford
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- Published on Tuesday, 17 February 2009 14:00
Faculty of Philosophy
POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIP IN PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Grade 7, £28,839 - £35,469 per annum
Fixed-term for two years from 1 October 2009
complete description here.
A fixed-term research and teaching appointment in Philosophy of Cognitive Science is available from 1 October 2009 for two years. This initiative is designed to provide an intensive and supported career development opportunity for an outstanding academic at an early stage of his or her career, and to promote equality of opportunity by helping to create a more diverse pool of potential candidates for future academic posts at Oxford or elsewhere. Applications for this post are especially welcome from women and ethnic minorities, who are under-represented among the University’s academic staff (section 38 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and section 48 of the Race Relations Act 1976 apply).
This Fellowship is offered by the Faculty of Philosophy. The successful candidate must have obtained his or her doctorate by 1 October 2009, and should not normally have completed it earlier than 1 October 2005. He or she will have a proven track record of research in the area of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, and will demonstrate potential for producing outstanding research in this area within the period of the Fellowship.
Postdoctoral Fellows are offered the opportunity to develop their expertise in both research and teaching. They will also have an academic mentor as well as a personalised career and professional development package, including the opportunity to undertake the University’s Postgraduate Diploma in Learning and Teaching.
Further particulars, including details of how to apply, can be obtained here (PDF).
The deadline for receipt of applications and references is Friday 6 March 2009.
The University of Oxford is an equal opportunities employer.
(Archive) Doctoral and Post-doc position at the Max Planck Institute in Nijmegen
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- Published on Wednesday, 17 December 2008 17:28
Archive: the deadline is passed.
Research positions for
1 Postdoctoral Researcher and 1 Ph.D. student
are available in the research group ‘Comparative Cognitive Anthropology' at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (Nijmegen, NL). The successful applicants will be expected to work on cognitive diversity across human cultures and play a key role in designing, implementing, analysing and writing up experiments.
The Post-doc stipend is initially available for 1 year (possibly extendable). The PhD position is available for up to 3 years.
Research Focus: The research group ‘Comparative Cognitive Anthropology' represents a collaborative effort between the Max Planck institutes for Psycholinguistics and Evolutionary Anthropology and aims at experimentally studying cognition across diverse human cultures. Studies shall focus on questions about i) similarities and differences in physical and social cognition across diverse cultures, ii) the psychological mechanisms creating and maintaining cognitive diversity across groups and iii) ontogeny of social competence in human infants. The research group works in close cooperation with the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck institute for Psycholinguistics and the Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.
Read more: (Archive) Doctoral and Post-doc position at the Max Planck Institute in Nijmegen
(Archive) Senior fellowships at CRÉUM (Montreal)
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- Published on Tuesday, 25 November 2008 08:52
Archive: the deadline is passed.
(pour la version en français voir: http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article484)
The University of Montreal's Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉUM) is proud to announce senior fellowship grants. We are inviting applications of professor-researchers for residential fellowships which can vary in length according to individual circumstances. Fellowships up to 40 000 $ will be awarded for the academic year 2009-2010.
CRÉUM's mission is to contribute to interdisciplinary research and graduate training in the areas of fundamental and applied ethics.
We encourage applications from researchers working in the principal research domains of CRÉUM: fundamental ethics (meta-ethics, etc.), ethics and politics, ethics and health, ethics and economy, ethics and the environment. We also accept applications from different domains, inasmuch as their research has a direct link with ethics.
(Archive) Position at Harvard Graduate School of Education
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- Published on Saturday, 25 October 2008 06:26
Archive: the deadline is passed.
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INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
The Harvard Graduate School of Education (HGSE) invites applications for positions in International Education and Development, at the rank of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, Professor or Lecturer, depending on qualifications. (At HGSE, Lecturers are individuals with extensive professional experience and a primary commitment to practitioner preparation programs.)
Read more: (Archive) Position at Harvard Graduate School of Education
"Very well-rounded analysis. A few thoughts. First, I am glad you mentioned nurses in your comment* because in the article you discount this, perhaps unintentionally. I remember my aunt consistently bribing the nurses when my uncle was recovering from a stroke for several months in the hospital. Also, I've had many conversations with my family here in Hungary about this, trying to understand the rationale behind this irrational system (I'm originally from the US). I think both motivations could be at play here. I got the impression that, in addition to the bribe, people are still very sensitive to the "wage supplement" aspect. That is, most people I've talked to find the wages of doctors and other health care providers rather deplorable. Even if GMs are a considerable expense for my working class family members, they seems to use the wage supplement as a way to render this dysfunctional reality more palatable somehow. I also think there is a third factor at work here - but I think it's linked to the others. I've witnessed situations where doctors behave very condescendingly toward patients or their families, despite a hefty bribe of some 20,000 HUF. Part of that harks back to the days of the socialist regime - when the power of public authorities was unquestioned. As one of my Hungarian friends likes to say about health clinics here: "they just want to make you feel like they still have power over you." When my aunt and I went to visit my cousin in critical care last year, the doctor didn't want to give us the time of day. We didn't give her a tip, but we kept pressing her for answers. I said to her, "is it a virus or a bacteria?" The doctor looked at me like a deer in headlights. I think she was surprised I even knew the difference. She opened up quite a lot to us after that and we never gave her a tip. Finally- and I'll get off my soapbox - private insurance systems are not necessarily more transparent. The US being a case in point. There is a great (surprisingly) 28-pg TIME article about this, "The bitter pill: why medical bills are killing us." I'm sue you'd find it relevant. Anyway, thanks so much for posting this!!"
*This is the comment by me which Eva refers to:
"I should have also added that, in fact, there is GM directed to nurses when they are perceived as the primary caretakers. Usually this is the case for families having elderly parents in retirement houses."
That GM thing reminds me of a funny routine that happens in France: around the end of the year, firemen and mailmen knock at your door to sell (ugly) calendars. Folk wisdom holds that if you don't buy the calendar, firemen will not rush if there is a fire in your house. Similarly, mailmen will be more likely to lose important mail you receive. What is striking is that this belief seems to carry on though it makes complete non-sense. I bet the situation is a bit different as for GM: the physician obviously remembers you and s/he is more likely to act benevolently towards you with a bit of extra money...
Azzouni certainly has the bona fides to weigh in on this. But it seems to me that the pure sociology of it isn't quite so simple.
Take Wiles' first proof of Taniyama-Shimura. It had an error, but it took concerted efforts by extreme experts to locate it. But that's not the end of the story. It turns out that he and Richard Taylor were able to ascertain that piecing together two parts of the theory that didn't quite seem to work on their own was in fact enough to 'patch' the proof together (Wiles himself says as much).
So, Yes, the original proof was wrong. To a much lesser extent, Perelman didn't fill in all the blanks in his landmark proof of Poincare, leading to a (minor scandal) where two other mathematicians claimed to give the "first" proof based on the "ideas of" Perelman and Hamilton.
The question is this: if someone had done the patching of Wiles' proof for him, would THEY be the prover? How large does the hole have to be? When an error is found, who gets to decide whether it is trivial, whether it wrecks the proof entirely, and who will be the one credited with the insight that makes the whole thing work?
These are not trivial matters, and the issue isn't apportioning credit, but deciding what an error truly is. Typos don't count. Proving incorrect results certainly do. But what about "generally correct" ideas that eventually lead to a proof? How loose do those ideas have to be?
I don't think there's ANY argument about when large, demonstrable errors have been found in published proofs. But there are many other cases -- like de Branges' purported proof of the Riemann Hypothesis -- that fall through these neat cracks.
In respect to kinship terminologies, Levinson's question, "What constrains this exuberant diversity of systems?", is not answered by Kemp and Regier's analysis for one simple reason: Terminologies have a structure and logic, like grammars for language, that determine the possible range of kinship terminologies. Kemp and Regier assume any partition of the space of genealogical relations is a potential terminology and then show that existing terminologies occupy only a small portion of this space due, they assert, to a tradeoff between simplicity and usefulness. This would be like saying a sentence can be any subset of all possible vocabulary words, then asserting that the realized languages have sentences that are a tradeoff between simplicity and usefulness, but ignoring the fact that the simplicity and usefulness of sentences is created through the grammar of the language that constrains what are admissible sentences. The same is true for kinship terminologies, and the answer to Levinson's question has already been made by showing that kinship terminologies have a generative structure that determines the corpus of kinship terms, starting from the primary kin terms of a terminology, along with kinship concepts that are expressed in the terminology (such as reciprocity of kin terms), and the kinship structural properties embedded in a particular terminology (Read 1984, 2001, 2007, 2009; Read and Behrens 1990; Leaf and Read 2012, among others). For example, the difference giving rise to the fundamental division of terminologies into descriptive versus classificatory (bifurcate merging) terminologies derives from two different ways that sibling relations are conceptualized in different societies: (1) a sibling is the child of my parent other than myself (descriptive terminologies) or (2) siblings are those persons who have parents in common (classificatory terminologies) (Bennardo and Read 2007; Read, Fischer and Leaf 2013). Trying to understand kinship terminologies (and hence kinship systems) without first working out the generative logic of a terminology is like trying to understand languages without working out the grammar of a language. Extensive work has already been published on the generative logic of kinship terminologies and this work makes evident what constrains the variability in kinship terminologies that Levinson asks about.
References
Bennardo, G. and D. Read 2007. Cognition, Algebra, and Culture in the Tongan Kinship Terminology. Journal of Cognition and Culture 7: 49-88.
Leaf, M. and D. Read. (2012) Human Thought and Social Organization: Anthropology on a New Plane. Lanham: Lexington Press
Read, D. l984. An algebraic account of the American kinship terminology. Current Anthropology 25: 4l7-440
Read, D. 2001 What is Kinship? In The Cultural Analysis of Kinship: The Legacy of David Schneider and Its Implications for Anthropological Relativism, R. Feinberg and M. Ottenheimer eds. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. Pp. 78-117.
Read, D. 2007. Kinship Theory: A Paradigm Shift. Ethnology 46(4):329-364
Read, D. 2009. Another Look at Kinship: Reasons Why a Paradigm Shift is Needed. Algebra Rodtsva 12:42-69.
Read, D. and C. Behrens. 1990. KAES: An expert system for the algebraic analysis of kinship terminologies. J. of Quantitative Anthropology 2:353-393.
Read, D., Fischer, M. and M. Leaf. 2013. What are kinship terminologies, and why do we care? A computational approach to analyzing symbolic domains. Social Science Computer Review 31(1): 16-44.
Yes, kinship is back -- or more accurately, it is reclaiming its original vigor. Haven't you heard of the Kinship Circle? For each of the past three years, and as part of this year's annual meeting of the Amerian Anthropological Association as well, we have had highly successful sessions on kinship. The sessions have been integrated with the themes of each of the meetings. We have had an international group of scholars from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, England, France, Germany, Italy, Qatar and the United States, presenting a wide range of papers, ranging from more "classic" questions about kinship systems to current research that is challenging some of our theoretical ideas about what constitutes kinship. The papers from the first two sessions will be published shortly.
Dwight Read
Fadwa El Guindi
Dear learned scholar of mathematicians, I disagree with your premise that mathematicians do not disagree, and, being wonderful souls, are easily converted to consensus. No less a scholar, intellectual and role model than Von Neumann (1961), the founder of game theory, argued against your premise. In fact, he bemoaned that unlike physicists, mathematicians who don't agree behave in an unsocial manner by striking out in new directions, leaving their conflicts unresolved. In his article, the first in his collected works, Von Neumann wished that mathematicians disagreed as physicists did. Whenever conflict arose between two physicists (e.g., Bohr and Einstein), physicists refused to ignore it, often bringing their field to a standstill until a resolution was found (i.e., consensus via debate, unlike your fanciful example of consensus without debate). I have long cherished Von Neumann's insight, and his remarkable paper on mathematicians. BTW, in my research, I too have found that consensus without conflict is indeed possible, except that none of the participants can agree on the result.
Von Neumann, J. (1961). The mathematician. Collected works, Pergamon.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/magazine/the-professor-the-bikini-model-and-the-suitcase-full-of-trouble.html?_r=3&
People concur in saying that Frampton is unusually gullible.
This story of an incredibly gullible scientist (or so it seems) might also be relevant to your remark that the optimality of epistemic vigilance can only be measured in view of its fit to the milieu. An optimal epistemic vigilance would enable people to believe most of the true things they are told and to disbelieve most of the false things they are told (especially the costly one). The inconvincible sceptic as well as the gullible has less than optimal epistemic vigilance. The optimal vigilance fall in between, but its precise position depends on whether the environment is full of false claims or not. It would be interesting to know whether there are different cognitive developments of epistemic vigilance depending on the type of environment in which a child grows up. This could account for some variability across individuals.
As for scientists, they are supposed to instantiate high epistemic vigilance. So how can Frampton be at the same time so gullible and a good physicist? I see two non-exclusive possibilities:
(1) Frampton exercises epistemic vigilance, but only in the domain of physics. This can happen because the scientific environment fosters argumentative abilities. By contrast, Frampton did not wish or need to convince others that he was having a relation with a beautiful model. He did not need to find good reasons for his beliefs and did not wish to adress counter-arguments. Hugo Mercier pointed to me that this difference in the argumentative context could explain the fact that Newton, with so great achievements in physics, did so badly in chemistry/alchemy. There was in alchemy no need to convince others; it was a secret enterprise.
(2) Frampton does not exercise much epistemic vigilance, but does well in physics nonetheless because the process of checking the plausibility of claims is distributed to others. Only very selected information arrives to his creative mind. This is thanks to the process through which scientific information comes to be distributed---the review process for instance. In science, epistemic vigilance is distributed across individuals and institutionalised. In that context, some gullibility might be an advantage. The schoolgirl, in any case, does better by believing the apparently crazy things that her teacher says (e.g. sound is the vibration of matter). At the research level also, it can pay to believe improbable hypotheses; it means pursuing a high risk, high reward research programme.
Thank you all for the very interesting discussion!
First, I would like to recommend a paper by Paul Rubin entitled “Folk Economics," where some of the views that have come out of the discussion are treated in an evolutionary framework.
In addition, I would like to mention that during my doctorate I have worked on the intellectual aversion for the market economy from a historical angle, studying the implications of the rhetorical phenomenon of the personification of money in the English literature of the early modern period. Comparing the economic views expressed by satyrical dramatists and pamphleteers to those of the economists of the time, aka the “early mercantilists,” I found out that the characterization of money as a supernatural force that takes hold of human behavior (a “visible god,” as Shakespeare called it) reveals a naive understanding on the part of the writers of the social and economic transformation taking place at the time. Most of them overlooked the economic implications of that transformation, and construed it merely as a process of corruption of traditional ethical values. This investigation led me to conclude that a promising line of research on the aversion for the market economy might consist in understanding how lay people make sense of complex economic ideas.
Let me give you a hint. When economists use such concepts as rationality, profit, cost, trade, competition, and so on, they are using words that embed a whole set of assumptions, a shared knowledge that defines the economic way of thinking. On the other hand, also common people are exposed to this jargon in their daily life: they often use the same words, but they arguably attach to it a different, non-technical meaning. How does that meaning form? Drawing on the culture and cognition research program, I have hypothesized that it forms according to the way people relate their own understanding on the word in question with real-world examples of which they have personal experience. More generally, our opinion on matters on which we have no special competence may emerge from the relation we establish between the delusively familiar ideas involved in them and our own interpretation of the small piece of world we see around us.
I have more fully developed this hypothesis here. I’ve recently also uploaded a draft here, in which I explore the topic of the aversion to the market using as a case study the Italian movies of the economic boom era. It turns out, that the Italian filmmakers, just as the English dramatists of a few centuries earlier, were quite wary of the capitalistic development of the country.
Let us suppose that there is a characteristic (or a set thereof) which determines the functioning of epistemic vigilance, and let us suppose that this characteristic varies between individuals. Simply put, some individuals are more gullible than others, everything else being held constant. These individuals are unversed in worldly matters, or they have an inclination to believe everything they are being told, or an inclination to trust everyone. Maybe they present a combination of these features. Among these, only the most gullible ones would fall for a 419 Nigerian scam. (I am referring to current circumstances, not to those of initial scams). You must have never paid attention to web security to have never heard about the scam, and you must be very trusting of people to put your money into their hands, or as greedy as to make you blind to the telltale signs. I’d say you are lot more gullible than almost everyone I know - your characteristics of epistemic vigilance make you a clear outlier.
But victims of fool’s errands are no outliers. Although, (in my estimation) most novice workers fall for the prank, I would consider their epistemic vigilance as entirely warranted by the situation. By warranted, I mean that they are as vigilant as required to function as competent social actors given that they know apprentices should trust their masters, that their technical competence is low and obscure terms will appear in conversations, etc. They know no more and no less than the average novice and are as gullible (in terms of personal characteristics - see above) as the next guy. Moreover, they are as epistemically vigilant when they leave to search for a “pipe-stretcher” as when searching for a “round about” (a real tool with funny-sounding name used for pipelines). What differentiates a fool’s errand from a normal request is the malicious intention of pranksters. The “initiated” know that victims cannot tell the difference between a real and an imaginary tool, that victims trust them with expertise and professionalism, etc. The dice are loaded from the start against the “fool”, and the prankster knows it.
To sum up, I would say that deceivers in each case are angling for different fish in different waters. 419’ers search for the easy prey, the most gullible individuals from an immense pool of unknown recipients. They send out the lure and expect the golden fish, yet know nothing about potential victims. Organisers of fool’s errands are shooting fish in a barrel, since they have control over specific victims in advantageous institutional settings ( distribution of knowledge,structure of command, authority of social roles, etc). This explains the vast difference in success rates between the two forms of deception: one is addressed to millions of users to “capture” a few, the other aims at a handful to ensnare most of them. In order to make the contrast clearer, I venture to say that most people tricked in “fool’s errands” would avoid Nigerian scams. A victim of 419 starting as an apprentice is doomed by the double handicap of institutionalised ignorance and personal gullibility. On a more amusing line, 419 artists would like to replicate the power of fool’s errand practitioners, such as by cracking into the email database of “I am wealthy and I trust unknown people too much” Anonymous.
The interesting theoretical implication suggested by your comment addresses the level at which we evaluate epistemic vigilance. On the one hand, we have the level of personal traits of gullibility. On the other hand, we have the level of structures of knowledge distribution. Can we pry them apart analytically? Empirically, it is problematic since it is very possible that forms of deception take into account both levels. For example, one would not attempt a “fool’s errand” with a highly suspicious apprentice bound to ask questions defusing the prank. Perhaps scammers try to eliminate segments of likely targets according to their web expertise (this is Herley’s argument).
One example comes to mind where both levels are addressed by scammers. On La Rambla in Barcelona, extremely well organised groups of con men play the three card trick. They target individuals with scarce local knowledge - tourists - by using a “touristy” location. However, their hope lies with the most gullible (greedy? drunk? careless?) tourists which can be parted with their money. The population of likely “marks” is selected by con artists (at the level of distributed social competence), while the actual mark selects himself by betting on the rigged game (at the level of individual characteristics).
Sorry for the long reply which mostly stated the obvious and restated in a less concise form your keen observations - but I think there is something theoretically interesting here: is epistemic vigilance only something “in the head”? Or do we need to rely upon an externalist perspective in which levels or mechanisms of epistemic vigilance can only be judged in the context of wider institutions of knowledge production and distribution? On my part, I think future explorations in the latter direction are promising.
P.S. Thinking about gains: fool’s errands are about hearty laughs and humiliating social initiation. Three card tricks aim for the quick buck, 50 euros made in a few minutes, a score of marks per day. 419 target the rare and precious victim, stripped of considerable sums after a prolonged investment in deceptive maneuvers. An association between kinds of gain and kinds of exploited weakness in epistemic vigilance?